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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE-SEX DISCRIMINATION-
SEX: A SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973).
S HARON A. FRONTIERO, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force,
sought increased benefits for her husband as a "dependent" under
37 U.S.C. Sections 401, 4031 and 10 U.S.C. Sections 1072, 10762 Those
statutes provide that spouses of male members of the uniformed services
are always dependents for purposes of obtaining increased quarters
allowances and medical and dental benefits, but that spouses of female
members are not dependents unless they are, in fact, dependent for
over one-half of their support.
3
When her application was denied for failure to satisfy the dependency
standard, appellant and her husband 4 brought suit in the District Court
against the Secretary of Defense, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
and contending that the difference in treatment under these statutes
constitutes an unconstitutional discrimination against servicewomen in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
5 The
District Court, relying on Reed v. Reeds rejected appellant's constitu-
tional challenge and concluded that the statutory scheme on a whole was
1 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1962) provides in pertinent part: "In this chapter, 'dependent,'
with respect to a member of a uniformed service, means ... (1) his spouse;...
However, a person is not a dependent of a female member unless he is in fact
dependent on her for over one-half of his support...."
2 10 U.S.C. § 1072 (1958) provides in pertinent part:
(1) 'Uniformed services' means the armed forces and Commissioned Corps of
the Coast and Geodetic Survey and of the Public Health Service. (2)
'Dependent,' with respect to a member ... of a uniformed services, means...
(A) the wife;... (C) the husband, if he is in fact dependent on the member
... for over one-half of his support; ....
3 37 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1962) and 10 U.S.C. § 1071 et seq. (1958). Thus, under
37 U.S.C. § 403 (1962), a member of the uniformed services with dependents is
entitled to an increased "basic allowance for quarters" while, under 10 U.S.C. § 1076,
a member's dependents receive comprehensive medical and dental care.
4 Joseph Frontiero was a full-time college student at the time of the suit. He received
$205 per month in veterans' benefits while his total expenses were $354 per month.
Thus, it was clear that he was not dependent upon his wife for more than one-half
of his support.
5 Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (1972), rev'd, Frontiero v. Richardson, 93
S. Ct. 1764 (1973).
6404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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not one which classifies on the basis of sex and that there was a rational
basis for the different treatment. 7
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.8 Speaking for four
members of the Court,9 Mr. Justice Brennan rejected the rational basis
test on which the lower court relied and concluded that classifications
based upon sex, as classifications based upon race, alienage, and national
origin, are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny.10 Brennan further concluded that administrative convenience,
although not without some importance, is not a "shibboleth" and any
statute which draws a sharp line between the sexes solely for the purpose
of achieving administrative convenience is arbitrary and violates the
Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. n
Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment agreeing that the
statutes constitute an unconstitutional discrimination against service-
women in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
but refused to extend Reed to hold that all classifications based upon sex
are inherently suspect.'2 Justice Stewart, relying on Reed, concurred in the
judgment12 while Mr. Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter. 14
In Reed,'5 the mother and father of a deceased son filed separate
petitions for administration of decedent's estate. Involved was an Idaho
statute that compelled a preference for males over females of equal
7 341 F. Supp. at 209. The District Court determined the constitutionality of the
statute by inquiring whether the classification established by the legislation was
reasonable, not arbitrary, and whether there was a rational connection between the
classification and a legitimate governmental end. The District Court stated that Reeddid not require states which allegedly discriminated on the basis of sex to meet the
compelling interest test but need only satisfy the rational connection standard.
Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
s Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973).
9 Mr. Justices Douglas, Marshall and White concurred with the Brennan opinion.
1093 S. Ct. at 1768. See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); and Qyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633(1948) (national origin).
1193 S. Ct. at 1772. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Shapiro v.Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
12 93 S. Ct. at 1773. Concurring with Mr. Justice Powell were the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice Blackmun.
12 93 S. Ct. at 1772.
14 Id. at 1773.
15 404 U.S. 71. The Reed opinion by Chief Justice Burger was for a unanimous court.
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entitlement.16 The Court held that regardless of their sex, persons within
any one of the enumerated classes are similarly situated and in providing
dissimilar treatment for men and women thus similarly situated, the
challenged sections of the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.
7
The Court in Reed applied the rational basis test 18 and inquired
whether the classification established by the legislation was reasonable, not
arbitrary, and whether there was a rational connection between the
classification and a legitimate governmental end.19 Classifications based
upon sex were not declared inherently suspect and the Court found it
sufficient in Reed to hold only that the mandatory preference for males,
merely to eliminate hearings, was the "very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 2
0
Up to and including the Reed decision, no federal court2' had ever
held sex a suspect classification although there had been important
decisions which, however limited in their holdings, did help to eradicate
sexual discriminations. 22 Now for the first time members of the Supreme
16 IDAHO CODE § 15-312 (1948) provided in part:
Priorities in right of administration: Administration of the estate of a person
dying intestate must be granted to some one or more of the persons hereinafter
mentioned, and they are respectively entitled thereto in the following order:
1. The surviving husband or wife or some competent person whom he or she
may request to have appointed. 2. The children. 3. The father or mother. ....
IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (1948) provided: "Preferences: of several persons claim-
ing and equally entitled to administer, males must be preferred to females...."
Section 15 has since been repealed in its entirety. See IDAHO CODE § 15-1-101 (Supp.
1973).
17 404 U.S. at 77.
18 The reasonableness test as used in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) is the
traditional test. This is similar to the test applied by the District Court, see note 7,
supra. See also Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
19 404 U.S. at 76.
20 Id.
21 There were some high state court decisions which recognized the need for close
judicial scrutiny. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485
P.2d. 529 (1971); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968). In
Sail'er Inn the court overruled a statute which barred females from working as
bartenders and blasted the reasonableness test used by the Supreme Court adopting
instead the more stringent "suspect classification" and "compelling interest" tests.
22 See Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E. D. Va.
1971) (compulsory leave four months before expected birth of child was arbitrary
and without basis in medical reason); Seidenberg v. McSorley's Ole Ale House, Inc.,
317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (required tavern to permit women entry and
service); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969) (struck
down state thirty-pound lifting regulation for women); United States v. York, 281 F.
Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) (declared unconstitutional a statute which permitted adult
women to be jailed for periods in excess of the maximum applicable to men guilty of
the same offense); Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich.
1966) (struck down the common law rule that a wife can't recover in a cause of
action based on loss of consortium).
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Court have declared sex a suspect classification and subject to strict
judicial scrutiny. Although the Brennan opinion did not obtain a
majority vote, the Frontiero decision, read in its entirety, appears to
be the coup de grice against sexual discrimination.
The Brennan opinion effectively reviews the history of our nation's
prejudicial treatment of women. Beginning with Mr. Justice Bradley's
famous statement made over a hundred years ago, 23 which fostered this
paternalistic attitude, and then reviewing some of the biased distinctions
which have burdened the freedom of women,24 Justice Brennan concludes
that sex is an "immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident
of birth." 25 He further states that the imposition of special disabilities
upon members of a particular sex would seem to violate the basic concept
of our system that "legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility. ' 26 This strong language continues when Brennan
states that sex characteristics "frequently bear no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society."27
The decision to declare sex a suspect classification will find support
from most legal writers. 2 Brennan cites the increased sensitivity which
Congress has manifested towards sex-based classifications and Congress'
conclusion that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious.29
This is of particular interest since Mr. Justice Powell felt that Congres-
sional action precluded the Court from entering this field 30 while
Mr. Justice Brennan finds it authority for his decision.
In concurring, Mr. Justice Powell refused to extend the Reed holding
to include sex as a suspect classification but preferred to reserve such
232Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. [16 Wall] 130, 141 (1873). The statement reads in
part: "[T]he paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator."
24 93 S. Ct. at 1769. Some examples cited by the court were: holding offices, serving
on juries, bringing suit and holding or conveying property. See generally L. KANTO-
wrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW: TIM UNFINISHED REvoLUTION (1969); G. MYvRAL,
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1073 (2d ed. 1962).
25 93 S. Ct. at 1770.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See generally Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality,
1972 S. CT. REv. 157; Martin, The Equal Rights Amendment, 17 ST. Louis L.J. 1
(1973); Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State Protection Laws, 44 DENVER L.J.
344 (1969); Phillips v. Martin Marieta Corp.: A Muted Victory, 22 CATH. U.L. REV.
441 (1973); Pregnancy Discharges in the Military: The Air Force Experience, 86
HARv. L. REv. 568 (1973); Mandatory Maternity Leaves for Teachers-The Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 N.C.L. REV.
768 (1973).
2993 S. Ct. at 1770, citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 and § I of the Equal Rights Amendment.
30 93 S. Ct. at 1773.
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expansion for the future since he found the authority of Reed sufficient
to decide the case.31 He also stated that the Equal Rights Amendment
32
which Mr. Justice Brennan specifically cites as authority, if adopted,
33 will
represent the will of the people "accomplished in the manner prescribed
by the Constitution" and determine the precise question presented
by the case.
34
Therefore, while Mr. Justice Powell preferred to allow any change
at the present time to come from Congress and through the prescribed
constitutional process, Mr. Justice Brennan viewed this process as
authority on which to base a judicial decision. The crux of the problem
is whether or not the court, by declaring sex a suspect classification, is
pre-empting the legislative field. Sex is similar to race, national origin, and
alienage, and as has been established previously, 35 the Supreme Court
has not found it necessary to wait for a constitutional amendment before
declaring these classifications suspect. It has also been stated that if the
Court had taken such a position (holding sex as a suspect classification),
an Equal Rights Amendment would not be necessary.3 6 One can view the
Equal Rights Amendment as a mini equal protection clause and a
legislative reaction to the court's failure to provide sufficient legal
protection for females. It therefore appears that it is the legislature
attempting, via the Equal Rights Amendment, to fill a void left by the
Court rather than, as Mr. Justice Powell contends, the Court pre-empting
the legislative field by holding sex a suspect classification.
The Powell opinion does raise some question as to what the
Frontiero decision would have been had there been no Equal Rights
Amendment pending ratification or had it already been accepted or
rejected. It is possible that had any of the foregoing situations existed, the
Brennan opinion would have commanded a majority of the court.
Speculation aside the fact is that four Justices have already held sex as a
31 Id.
32 Amendment XXVII [Proposed]: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." This
proposed amendment was passed by Congress on March 22, 1972. See H. J. Res.
No. 208, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972).
33 The proposed amendment was given seven years to be ratified by three-fourths of
the states. On March 15, 1973, Connecticut became the twenty-ninth state and on
March 22, 1973, Washington was the thirtieth to ratify the amendment. As of August
18, 1973, ten states have rejected the amendment. See 31 CONG. Q. W. REP. 43
(Jan. 13, 1973); 305 (Feb. 10, 1973); 500 (March 10, 1973); 820 (April 14, 1973).
34 93 S. Ct. at 1773.
35 93 S. Ct. at 1768. See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); and Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948) (national origin).
36 Sedler, The Legal Dimensions of Women's Liberation; An Overview, 47 IND. LIJ.
419,424 (1972).
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suspect classification 37 and three others3 s seem to say that it is now
improper for the court to do so. Only Stewart and Rehnquist offer no
indication of joining the Brennan view in a future decision.39 If any of
these Justices would join the Brennan opinion, this view would then
become a majority and add a tremendous force to women's rights
and completely abolish sexual discrimination. This had been the hope
in Reed which, however, failed to materialize.40
Even though the Brennan view did not obtain a majority vote, it
nonetheless commands notice and hopefully is an indication of future
holdings in this area. The Brennan opinion is important whether or not
the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified. Assuming that the Amendment
is ratified by the requisite number of states, it will only be applicable to
governmental action and will not affect private action or purely social
relationships between men and women.4 This is also true concerning
other Constitutional Amendments such as the Equal Protection Clause
and the Due Process Clause. 42 Nonetheless, even though the E.R.A. will
not be applicable, the holding of sex as a suspect classification by the
Court brings a psychological lift to the women's rights movement. Of
course if the E.R.A. fails to obtain the necessary number of state ratifica-
tions, then such a holding would become even more important since it
would then be the basis of any attack against sexual discrimination.
The Frontiero decision is a constitutional landmark. In recent years,
both federal and state courts have been intensely skeptical of distinctions
based on sex.40 That the general trend in the country is the abolition of
sexual discrimination is evidenced by the E.R.A. With the Frontiero
decision attorneys will be able to cite a judicial holding which will
37 They being Justices Douglas, Marshall, White and Brennan.
38 These Justices are Powell, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger.
39 Rehnquist for the obvious reason that he dissented from the majority holding and
affirmed the lower court's view and Stewart since his brief opinion merely reaffirms
Reed and does not allow much room for speculation.
405 CREIGHTON L. REv. 353 (1972); 25 VAND. L. REv. 412 (1972); 1972 Wis. L.
REv. 626.
41See 118 CoNo. REv. 4531-613 (daily ed. March 22, 1972).
4 2 See e.g., Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 161-74 (1970); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). But see
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See generally Barnett, What is "State"
Action under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of the Consti-
tution? 24 ORE. L. REv. 227 (1945); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a
Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962); Karst and Horowitz, Reitman
v. Mulky: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. Cr. REv. 39;
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1970); Williams,
The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 347 (1963); Current Developments
in State Action and Equal Protection of the Law, 4 GONZAGA L. REv. -233 (1969).
43 See Johnston and Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective, 46 N.Y. U.L. REv. 675 (1971); Note, Sex -Discrimination and Equal
Protection, Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment? 84 HAuv. L. REv., 1499 (1971)..
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carry great weight in any litigation. The Frontiero holding in effect
will supplant all of the previous decisions which have slowly eroded
the ghost of Mr. Justice Bradley.44
The only step remaining for complete judicial success in equal rights
for women is obtaining a fifth and therefore a majority vote of the Court.
If, and when this will be achieved remains to be seen, but a prediction
based upon the Frontiero decision must result in forecasting the Brennan
view as the future majority of the court.45
JOHN J. CooK
44 For a review of these decisions and Mr. Justice Bradley's remark, see notes 22
and 23, supra.
45How the Frontiero decision will affect the Equal Rights Amendment is difficult to
foresee. It is possible that this surprise decision could hinder the passage of the
proposed amendment. See Martin, The Equal Rights Amendment, supra note-28, at 16.
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